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Current research in public management reports a positive effect of agency network activity in
the interorganizational network on its performance (degree centrality hypothesis). This study
presents a different hypothesis: The embeddedness of agency network relations in cohesive
subgroups in the interorganizational network positively affects its performance (‘‘cohesive
subgroup’’ hypothesis). The dependent variable in the present study is organizational
performance and measured in terms of individual client satisfaction. The hypotheses are
tested using data on the interorganizational network of Dutch colleges for the training of
primary education teachers (n 5 28). These data are combined with college-level
performance and contextual data for 2002–2005 (n 5 90), and with the evaluations of
college graduates in a large sample of graduates for the same period (n 5 7,119).
Multilevel logistic regression analyses show that colleges’ cohesive subgroup membership
rather than college degree centrality significantly contributes to a positive evaluation by
graduates. These analyses control for various control variables at the college level and the
graduate level.
INTRODUCTION
Research in public management shows that interorganizational networks are important
determinants of the performance of public agencies and policies (Agranoff and McGuire
2003; Bardach 1998; O’Toole 1997). The body of research on interorganizational net-
works is growing rapidly (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000), and studies of agency
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performance (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2007) as well as network performance (Knoke
et al. 1996; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007) have become available. Recent empirical
studies on agency performance report that the network activity of public agencies ex-
plains organizational performance (Andrews et al. 2005; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole
2004; O’Toole and Meier 2004). For example, analyses of the ‘‘Texas public school
district data’’ consistently reveal signiﬁcant positive effects of the network activity
of directors of Texas school districts on various indicators of performance of their
district, such as pass rates and dropout rates (O’Toole and Meier 2004).1 Effects of
organizational network activity are also reported for ﬁrm performance, measured
by increased survival rates, economic output, and innovativeness (Powell and
Smith-Doerr 2005; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998).
In an interorganizational network, network activity is captured by the concept of de-
gree centrality: The most active agencies are those who have the most network ties to other
agencies in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 178). The present article analyzes
how an agency’s network activity—in terms of degree centrality—affects its performance.
On the basis of current research in public administration and organizational sociology, the
article argues that agencies with a high degree centrality in the interorganizational network
have ample access to resources and a potential for learning and cooperation. Access to
resources and information enables agencies to exploit their environment and buffer envi-
ronmental shocks—such as changes in political, economic, and technical demands (Meier
and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole 1997). Consequently, agencies with high levels of network
activity are expected to perform better.
Subsequently, the present article proposes an additional (or further) network effect
on agency performance: that of the embeddedness of agency relations in the interor-
ganizational network (Granovetter 1985). In terms of network analysis, network em-
beddedness is captured by the concept of organizational membership of a cohesive
subgroup. The most embedded agencies are those who are a member of a cohesive
subgroup of agencies in the network, all tied together by strong relations (Wasserman
and Faust 1994, 251–2). The article argues that cohesive subgroup membership in the
network positively affects performance (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Brass et al. 2004).2
The mechanism of network embeddedness is different from the mechanism of network
activity: An agency’s access to more, and more diverse, resources (as expressed by
degree centrality) is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for it to perform well. In order
for an agency to perform well, resources must be delivered with the quality agreed
upon. The likelihood that resources are delivered to an agency with the quality agreed
upon is greatly enhanced by the building of interagency trust. The building of mutual
trust is promoted by strong and cohesive relations in subgroups in the interorganiza-
tional network (Provan and Sebastian 1998; Schneider et al. 2003). In strong and co-
hesive subgroups, information about the (noncompliant) behavior of an agency comes
readily available to all agencies, which affects the agency’s reputation, and its potential
beneﬁts from future cooperation (Raub and Weesie 1990).
1 Studies at the level of the network report that the structure of network relations explains performance of the network
in terms of the aggregate post hoc satisfaction of network members (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000), or in terms of policy
effectiveness and problem-solving capacity (Provan and Milward 1995, 2001; Provan and Kenis 2008).
2 By taking cohesive subgroups, we focus on both ‘‘relational’’ embeddedness (referring to the strength or quality of
relations) and ‘‘structural’’ embeddedness (referring to the pattern of relations in the network). See Granovetter (1992).
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An important aim of the present article concerns the dependent variable: to analyze
agency performance at the level of the client population. Most studies deﬁne performance
indicators at the organizational level, often developed to quantify the monitoring and con-
trol of agencies (Boyne 2006). Examples of performance indicators at the level of the or-
ganization are the number of criminals arrested as a performance measure for police
departments, or dropout rates as a performance measure for schools (Propper and Wilson
2003). However, public agencies deliver services at the individual level and need to satisfy
the demands of clients. Provan and Milward (1995) argue that client satisfaction is a more
appropriate performance measure because public agencies are much less driven by proﬁt-
maximizing incentives than ﬁrms.
Finally, the present article applies multilevel analysis, which is the proper statistical
design to account for simultaneous variation at the level of the public agency and the level
of individual clients. Because data must be available with a relatively large number of cases
at each level, scholars in public administration seldom apply multilevel analysis and focus
instead on performance measures at the organizational level (Brewer and Selden 2000).
However, if we do not analyze organizational and client-level variation simultaneously,
it is not possible to validly estimate the effects of variables at the agency level and at
the client level. An additional advantage of multilevel analysis is that we are able to control
for selection effects at the level of the client. Although it is not immediately obvious
whether more innately talented graduates would evaluate their college more positively
or more negatively than their less talented peers, it is important to be able to control
for this.
For the present study, we compiled a unique data set that provides enough statistical
power to apply a multilevel design to study organizational network effects on the satisfac-
tion of clients of public agencies with the services provided. Data were collected in the ﬁeld
of Dutch higher education: the interorganizational afﬁliation network of 28 Dutch primary
education teacher training colleges. We selected this sector for two main reasons. First, the
student population is relatively large. Secondly, the training program is largely standard-
ized for all the colleges, so that the content of the educational programs offered is held more
or less constant. Performance was measured as the satisfaction of a large number of grad-
uates (n 5 7,119) with their study program for four cohorts in the period 2002–2005. In
order to assess how the colleges are embedded in the afﬁliation network, data were col-
lected on the network relations between all network members. This is seldom done in the
ﬁeld of public administration, where the standard approach is to measure the ‘‘ego net-
works’’ of agencies (e.g., Agranoff and McGuire 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004) partly
because of the difﬁculty of obtaining data on complete interorganizational networks. On the
basis of these data, the article demonstrates that an empirical link exists between graduate
satisfaction and the embeddedness of their colleges in the interorganizational network. An
exploration of all potential mediating and moderating mechanisms that may explain this
link—such as teacher motivation or the design of study programs—is beyond the scope of
the present article.
RESEARCH CONTEXT: COLLEGES FOR PRIMARY EDUCATION TEACHER TRAINING
The object of the study in the present article is the network of 28 primary education teacher
training colleges in the Netherlands (in Dutch: Pedagogische Academie Basisonderwijs or
PABO). These colleges form part of the Dutch system of universities of applied sciences
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(HBO), which offers more applied studies as compared to the research-oriented system of
Dutch universities.3 PABOs typically prepare students for a bachelors degree—although
recently two inter-college masters programs have been established. Within the universities
of applied sciences, these colleges offer a speciﬁc, 4-year bachelor program to train teach-
ers in primary education. They are the largest colleges within the system of universities of
applied sciences in the Netherlands (in 2006 total enrollment amounted to 35,000 students).
A PABO can be either part of a larger multisectoral general university of applied sciences
or constitute a single monosectoral college by itself. There are 20 multisectoral and eight
monosectoral colleges in the Netherlands. In contrast to the large general multisectoral
colleges (in 2006 enrollment ranged between 1,500 and 40,000), the monosectoral colleges
are relatively small (in 2006 enrollment ranged between 500 and 1,500 students). Differ-
ences in size between the PABOs themselves are less pronounced. Due to the particular
history of Dutch education, colleges can be public, catholic, or protestant, and this still
plays a role in the identity of the college and its training program.
Because the average PABO is dependent on the central government for about 65%
of its funding, the most important external partner for these organizations is the Min-
istry of Education, Science and Culture. Funding is based primarily on total student
enrollment but also includes a ‘‘dynamic demand factor,’’ which incorporates perfor-
mance measures such as dropout rates in the previous year and enrollment in the present
year (Kaiser, Vossensteyn, and Koelman 2001). Thus, these colleges have to compete
for students and resources. However, the colleges also have common interests. For ex-
ample, the reputation of the whole sector was damaged when heated political debate
and media attention focused on the poor math and language skills of PABO students.
The Minister of Education, Science and Culture personally intervened in their programs.
The PABOs are not only embedded in their sector but also in local networks. These
networks include the local authority, (boards of) local primary schools, and local reg-
ulatory agencies.
The interorganizational network of the colleges for primary school teacher training
is characterized by (1) participation in institutions or associations and (2) informal, bi-
lateral relationships between their directors and managers. The focus of the present
article is on the ﬁrst aspect (cf. Kraatz 1998). The most important formal institution
is the ‘‘Netherlands Association of Universities of Applied Sciences’’ or HBO-raad.4
The HBO-raad has one central board of directors and two different advisory boards:
a general advisory board for all universities of applied sciences, and a speciﬁc advisory
board for the PABOs. Participation of colleges in the general advisory board comprises
direct participation by directors of monosectoral colleges and representation of PABOs
within general multisectoral colleges by a college board member. The HBO-raad is also
3 Whereas the Dutch system of higher education in general is believed to have shifted from bureaucratic control to
a networked system (De Boer, Enders, and Leisyte 2007), the speciﬁc sector of primary education teacher training still
is subjected to strong regulatory control by parliament, ministers, and the Department of Education. Currently, major
reforms are being implemented in Dutch higher education. These reforms are the result of the Bologna Declaration of
1999, promoting Europe-wide student mobility, access to higher education, and comparability of degrees. The Bologna
Declaration led to the introduction of bachelors, masters, and doctorate degrees in Dutch higher education. The
universities of applied sciences seized the opportunity to develop masters programs in addition to their 4-year
bachelors programs.
4 This council could be described as a ‘‘network administrative organization’’ (Provan and Kenis 2008) because it
coordinates activities between universities of applied sciences and is the primary lobby institution for the sector.
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responsible for special committees, which monitor the implementation of government
regulations into the training programs, and in which some of the colleges are involved.
In addition to the HBO-raad, other institutions have developed in the past. For example,
all college managers meet in a consultation platform to discuss operational matters. This
platform has grown into a lobby network alternative to the PABO board of the HBO-
raad. Within the sector, two cooperation networks of smaller colleges emerged. In ad-
dition, two inter-college masters programs have been developed in which a subset of the
colleges collaborate. In each of these afﬁliations, PABOs develop common policies, set
the agenda for speciﬁc problems, and exchange vital information about standards, pro-
gram innovations, and resources. The joint activities and information exchange have
spin-off for the internal organization, and affect the cross-fertilization of information
and resources across different colleges.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Degree Centrality and College Performance
The public management literature stresses that the network activity of public agencies
enhances their performance. Systematic empirical evidence, however, is relatively scarce
(Boyne et al. 2006). A seminal work in this ﬁeld is the model of Meier and O’Toole, which
relates different types of management activities of agencies to their performance (Meier
and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004). In the Meier-O’Toole model, agency per-
formance is determined by the agency’s past performance, its environment, and network
management. The environment represents structural opportunities (e.g., funding possibil-
ities) and constraints (e.g., a high proportion of students from poor families) an actor faces.
In the model, the agency’s ability to yield a surplus value from environmental forces is
a function of ‘‘network management.’’ Two types of network management are distin-
guished: (1) management that exploits resources in the agency’s environment and (2) man-
agement that buffers environmental shocks, such as political, economic, and technical
demands (O’Toole 1997).
Meier and O’Toole test different variants of their model on the performance of
Texas school districts. In the empirical application to the Texas school districts, network
management is deﬁned in terms of network activity. District superintendents are asked
to indicate how frequently they interact with different categories of actors, such as
school board members, the Texas education agency, other superintendents, state legis-
lators, or local business leaders (Meier and O’Toole 2003, 692). In social network anal-
ysis, these are so-called ego-centered network data. Meier and O’Toole (2003, 692)
report that network activity highly correlates across the different categories of actors,
distinguishing the less active from the more active managers. Many different tests of the
model on the Texas school district data consistently show positive effects of network
activity of superintendents on the performance of their district—conditional upon a
certain degree of homogeneity of resources and environmental stability (O’Toole
and Meier 2004).
The present article studies a complete network of PABO colleges, which is a stable
interorganizational structure of public agencies voluntarily participating in formal collab-
orative platforms. The PABO network is a ﬁxed set of agencies (a complete interorgani-
zational network), in which all organizations are individually identiﬁed. For such networks,
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network activity is captured by the concept of degree centrality, which is the number of
network ties to other agencies in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 178).5 Isolated
agencies have a degree centrality of zero, whereas the maximum possible value is n 2 1
relations, where n is the number of agencies in the network. The concept of degree cen-
trality is more narrow than the intensity of relations to an undeﬁned number of actors within
a broad category, for which the assumption is that higher intensity implies interaction with
more actors.
PABO colleges enter the interorganizational platforms to extract resources from each
other and to share vital information about their environment, for example, about accred-
itation, fund raising, learning practices, or other methodical expertise. In addition, the
PABO colleges coordinate lobby activities and develop joint programs, such as master pro-
grams. Thus, for PABOs, network activity has the same implication as for Texas school
districts. It yields a surplus value from organizational and environmental resources. High
levels of activity in the interorganizational network provide a PABO with access to many
other PABOs—and hence to more, and more diverse, resources and information. Conse-
quently, PABOs learn and make use of new educational practices, technologies, and man-
agement innovations (Brass et al. 2004; Kraatz 1998; Mizruchi 1994; Stuart and Podolny
1999; Tsai 2001). PABOs with high levels of degree centrality in the interorganizational
network are more likely to join strategic alliances, which often have a positive effect on
performance, as research in R&D shows (Powell and Brantley 1992; Powell et al. 2005).
Because the exploitation of resources and information, and the buffer to environmental
shocks are expected to contribute to the performance of PABOs, we specify the relation
between degree centrality and performance as follows.
HYPOTHESIS 1. College degree centrality: The degree centrality of a college for primary
teacher training (PABO) in the interorganizational college network
positively affects its performance.
Cohesive Subgroups and College Performance
In interorganizational networks, the exchange of resources and information, and cooper-
ation in joint programs and activities, is not always straightforward. Resources obtained
must have some quality in order to contribute to the performance of the agency. Information
must be reliable and correct in order to stimulate learning. Likewise, the commitment of
agencies to cooperate in joint programs and actions—such as lobby activities—must be
credible in order to yield a surplus value from the agency’s environment (Coleman
1990). Investments in time (Agranoff 2007) or contracts ensure that exchanges of resources
and information, and cooperation in joint programs are not frustrated by opportunistic
behavior of partners (Williamson 1991).
An important mechanism to reduce transaction costs and nevertheless ensure agen-
cies’ credibility and reliability is the building of mutual trust. The existence of mutual trust
between agencies reduces transaction costs and stimulates their cooperation because agen-
cies adjust their beliefs about the likelihood that a network partner will ‘‘defect’’ or instead
5 In the present study we focus on degree centrality as the standard indicator for network activity in a complete
network. There are other rival notions of centrality in network analysis that capture other network characteristics. For
example, betweenness centrality captures the control of an actor over the interactions between other actors.
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act in accordance with the agreements made. Thus, performance is expected to be better for
agencies with trustworthy network relations (Provan and Sebastian 1998, 460).
In interorganizational networks, trust between agencies is promoted by network
embeddedness and not by network activity. An agency’s network relations are deﬁned
as ‘‘embedded’’ when they are simultaneously strong and ‘‘closed.’’ A strong network re-
lation between agencies stimulates the availability of information (Uzzi 1996) and the un-
derstanding of mutual needs and interests (Gulati 2007; Schneider et al. 2003). A closed
network relation implies that the two agencies share a link with other agencies (Coleman
1990). In closed network, relations information about the behavior of agencies becomes
available to third parties. Consequently, an agency’s reputation can be easily damaged
when it provides incorrect information, insufﬁcient resources, or withdraws from cooper-
ation (Raub and Weesie 1990). The agency’s reputation affects the likelihood of receiving
valuable information and resources in the future, from all parties involved in the closed
subnetwork (Buskens and Raub 2002).
In the complete network of PABO colleges, the appropriate indicator for network
embeddedness is cohesive subgroup membership. Network analysis deﬁnes a ‘‘cohesive
subgroup’’ as a set of actors who all are strongly tied to each other by a relation with a spec-
iﬁed strength (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 254, 277–82). Sociological studies ﬁnd support
for the idea that cohesive subgroup membership improves performance (Gulati 2007; Uzzi
1997), especially in relatively stable contexts (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). In
the ﬁeld of public management research, Provan and Sebastian (1998) report that a clique
of mental health service organizations with overlapping activities (which can be interpreted
as an indicator of strength) positively affects client satisfaction. For the PABO colleges,
we thus arrive at the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2. College cohesive subgroups: Colleges for primary teacher training
(PABO) that form cohesive subgroups within the interorganizational
college network perform better than weakly integrated colleges or
isolated colleges.
Contextual Effects
Interorganizational networks do not develop independently (Mizruchi 1994) from the
broader institutional context and organizational characteristics. Peng and Luo (2000) con-
trol for industrial growth rate and ﬁrm size when analyzing effects of managerial network-
ing on returns on assets and market shares. O’Toole and Meier (2004) identify and model
contextual effects on the performance of Texas high school districts. Because we evaluate
agency performance through client satisfaction, contextual factors include variables at the
level of the agency as well as variables at the level of clients.
It is obvious that PABO colleges with limited access to ﬁnancial means are expected to
perform worse, controlling for size of the student population. Although state funding of
universities of applied sciences in the Netherlands is equally distributed (Boezerooy
2003), some of the parameters that determine funding are subject to ﬂuctuations in student
enrollment or dropout rates. Some colleges also raise additional resources through contract
activities. Other factors at the level of the college may also determine performance.
O’Toole and Meier (2004) mention stability in personnel, mission or program stability,
production process, and procedures. For the present study of colleges for training primary
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school teachers, we take into account the variability in a number of college characteristics
for the period 2002–2005. In the Netherlands, wages are not under direct managerial con-
trol and wage changes affect all colleges in a similar way. Consequently, we do not include
them as contextual variables at the level of the colleges.
The composition of the student population also affects the performance of colleges.
Most importantly, students will differ in their capabilities and motivation due to selection
effects. Such selection effects should be accounted for if the dependent variable is at the
individual level (which is the case in the present study). It is not immediately obvious what
effect innate abilities and motivation would be likely to have on satisfaction with the chosen
college. On one hand, such students might attribute achievements that are due to their own
personal characteristics in part to the college, resulting in a higher level of satisfaction. On
the other hand, gifted and/or motivated students may have higher expectations, and report
lower levels of satisfaction for a given level of college performance. In either case, if net-
working colleges differ from nonnetworking colleges in their ability to attract the most
intelligent and diligent students in the population, it is important to control for this.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
To test the hypotheses, we focused on the performance of colleges for the training of pri-
mary education teachers in the period between 2002 and 2005. The motivation for the se-
lection of primary education teacher training is two-fold. First, the student population is
relatively large, and thus, we can expect that the sample sizes for college year combinations
is large enough to allow for statistical testing. Secondly, the training program is largely
standardized for all PABOs. The selection of years was motivated by the availability of
data.
We constructed one large data set from three different sources. The ﬁrst data source is
a number of qualitative interviews and document analyses, which—combined with some of
the tools of social network analysis—enabled us to make a reconstruction of the interor-
ganizational PABO network over the past years. The second data source is the management
information system of the universities of applied sciences, which is publicly accessible
(www.hbo-raad.nl) and provides, among others, all available facts and ﬁgures on PABO
characteristics. The third data source is the ‘‘HBO monitor,’’ coordinated by the Research
Centre for Education and the LabourMarket (ROA). This monitor is a yearly survey among
a large sample of all graduates of universities of applied sciences in the Netherlands. We
selected the subset of all graduates in the sample who graduated at a PABO between 2002
and 2005. The HBO monitor contains several questions about a graduate’s evaluation of
PABO performance. More speciﬁcally, we use graduate satisfaction with the PABO study
program as our dependent variable and main indicator for PABO performance. The years
reﬂect evaluations by separate groups of individual graduates, who are also nested in the
PABOs. Changes over time thus refer to differences between cohorts, not changes within
individuals.
In this way, we created a multilevel data set, in which graduates are nested in years (of
graduation) and PABOs. In total, 28 cases are available at the highest PABO level.6 At the
6 In total, there are 28 PABOs in the Netherlands. The data set contains 24 PABOs, of which two have multiple
locations (four and two). In the analyses, these locations are treated as separate colleges.
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PABO by year level, 90 cases are available.7 At the level of individual graduates, there are
9,146 cases, of which 7,119 have no missing value on any of the variables used in our
analyses. These 7,119 cases are used to test for effects of all variables at the different levels
on graduate satisfaction. Obviously, our research design does not permit us to generalize
beyond the sector of PABOs because this would require a comparative study of more
interorganizational networks in a similar fashion.8
The Interorganizational PABO Network
There are many different ways to deﬁne relations in a ‘‘total’’ or ‘‘whole’’ interorga-
nizational network. Examples are interlocks between managers, information exchange
networks, task-dependency relations, trust relations, or authority relations. For the pres-
ent study, we studied the network that develops from multiple ‘‘afﬁliations’’ of (rep-
resentatives of) organizations. Organizations are afﬁliated with more or less formal
institutions, cooperative networks, joint programs, and so forth. Data on the afﬁliations
of PABOs were collected using structured interviews with in total three key informants
who are experts in the domain of higher education. In addition, an extensive analysis of
documents and reports was performed. We analyzed annual PABO reports, reports from
the HBO-raad, accreditation reports, and minutes of meetings for indications of mem-
bership to in collaborative bodies or alliances and joint projects (for an overview of the
methodology used, see Marsden 2005; Torenvlied and van Schuur 1994). Informants
were selected on the basis of their long experience in the PABO ﬁeld and complemen-
tary competences (in policy making, management, and inter-PABO collaborative bod-
ies). One informant has been director of a large PABO college for more than 15 years
and involved in top managerial activities in the ﬁeld. Two informants are management
assistants to a collaborative body. Two interviews were held face to face and one by
telephone. All interviews were held in February 2008 and lasted for over 2 h. We cross-
validated the information of all sources to rule out potential retrospective biases
(Torenvlied 2000). The informants were asked which afﬁliations existed in which at
least two PABOs cooperated at the managerial level on either policy formulation or
joint program development.
It appears that in the Netherlands, colleges for training primary education teachers
participate in eight different afﬁliations. These include three formal institutions (three sub-
councils of the HBO-raad), a platform for smaller colleges, two cooperative networks
of smaller PABOs, and two inter-PABO masters programs.9 In six of these afﬁliations,
multiple PABO colleges participate, indicating joint afﬁliation. We assigned a PABO
to an afﬁliation only if it is directly represented in the afﬁliation by a director or board
member of the PABO.
7 Potentially, 28  4 5 112 cases are available, but the sample of graduates is empty for some PABO year
combinations.
8 It is the ambition of the authors to make a comparative study of a large number of interorganizational networks
using a similar multilevel approach. The present article is a ﬁrst step in that direction.
9 The full names are as follows: the HBO General Council, the HBO sectoral advisory committee for the educational
sector, an HBO steering committee for the educational policy agenda and monitoring of the quality of study programs,
the so-called ‘‘Ede-Beraad,’’ ‘‘Interactum,’’ and ‘‘ZEG’’ (Zwolle, Ede, Gouda), and development of master’s programs
‘‘Magistrum’’ and ‘‘Octaaf.’’
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Under the assumption that organizations have stronger (cooperative) relations if
their representatives meet more often, we collapsed the N  A afﬁliation matrix into
an N  N network matrix, with the number of mutual afﬁliations as entries. We used
UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999) to perform these operations. The in-
terorganizational network relations are valued, indicating the strength of the tie in
the afﬁliation network (by the number of mutual afﬁliations). From the network, we
computed two measures, corresponding to the theoretical concepts of college centrality
and cohesive subgroups. With respect to college centrality, we deﬁne degree centrality
of a focal PABO as the total number of other PABOs it is linked to. We deﬁne cohesive
subgroups as cliques of actors tied together with relations of some minimal strength
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, 278–8).
Context Variables and Other PABO Characteristics
Theoretically, we assume that network embeddedness complements the effects of con-
text variables on organizational performance. We therefore add a number of control
variables that provide alternative explanations for network effects on organizational per-
formance. We distinguish between two types of context variables: environmental var-
iables and organizational variables. With respect to environmental context variables, we
follow O’Toole and Meier (2004) who distinguish between (1) dependence upon state
funding and (2) diversity of funding. We deﬁne dependence on state funding as the
percentage of a PABOs total budget funded by government. We deﬁne diversity of
funding as a fractionalization measure of four sources of funding: (1) government fund-
ing, (2) tuition fees, (3) contract activities, and (4) other funds. We computed an inverse
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl concentration index, that is, 12 +
S
s51
x2s , where s denotes the source
of funding, S denotes the total number of sources, and xs denotes the fraction of the PABO
budget funded by the source. Both measures refer to each speciﬁc year of graduation.
With respect to organizational characteristics, we distinguish between (1) organiza-
tional stability, (2) the availability of resources, and (3) college performance. We include
two measures for organizational stability. The ﬁrst measure is the change in student enrol-
ment, deﬁned as the mean yearly absolute change in student enrolment over the 5 years
preceding graduation. The second measure is the change in personnel costs, deﬁned as
mean yearly absolute change in total costs for one full-time equivalent (fte) per student
over the 5 years preceding graduation in thousands of euros. We also include two variables
for the availability of resources. The ﬁrst measure is the student-personnel ratio, deﬁned as
total student enrollment divided by the total fte. for staff in the year of graduation. The
second measure is the solvency of the college. Personnel costs, student-personnel ratio,
and solvency are measured for the universities of applied sciences as a whole and refer
to the year of graduation. In the case of multisectoral colleges, we assume that these meas-
ures are distributed equally across different programs.
Graduate satisfaction could be affected by the performance of the college in the year
of graduation.10 To control for some indicators of college performance in the year of
10 We expect that signiﬁcant events in a students’ last year are primarily affected by college performance in the same
year and not in preceding years. Tests for effects of college performance in the years preceding graduation did not
change results.
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graduation we applied twomeasures: (1) the diploma rate and (2) the student dropout rate.11
The diploma rate is deﬁned as the number of graduates in a given year divided by the mean
of yearly total enrolment in the PABO over the period 1996–2005. We take the number of
graduates relative to themean enrolment for a long period to rule out short-term ﬂuctuations
in enrolment. Freshmen enrollment affects diploma rates (even though it also could be
interpreted as an indicator for good performance). When freshmen enrollment increases,
it also causes diploma rates to go down and is highly confounded with size of the college.
The student dropout rate is deﬁned as the number of freshmen dropouts as a proportion of
the total freshmen student enrolment for a given year. High dropout rates are indicators for
bad performance because colleges are assumed to motivate their students.12 Finally, we
added the important control variable enrolment in the PABO college. This variable is
deﬁned as the total student enrolment for the given year of graduation and is an indicator
for the size of the organization. Organization size provides information about the ability to
buffer shocks, such as employee illness. At the same time, graduates tend to evaluate
smaller colleges more positively than larger ones.
Graduate Satisfaction and Graduate-Level Control Measures
At the level of the graduates, we make use of the data provided by the HBO monitor.
More than 85% of all colleges participate in the survey. Items are included that measure
graduates’ perceptions of the educational program in which they were enrolled. Data are
collected between 1 and 1.5 years after graduation, and the average response rates are
about 40%–45% for PABO graduates (and a similar response rate for all college grad-
uates). Data for the period between 2002 and 2005 indicate that 90% of the graduates
found a job within 1 year: 85% as a primary school teacher and 5% as a teacher in
a different ﬁeld.
Organizational performance is a multifaceted concept, especially in the public sec-
tor, where organizational goals are multidimensional (Boyne 2003; Provan and Milward
1995). Objective measures of performance (‘‘hard’’ indicators) are often used to monitor
performance and ﬁgure predominantly in research on organizational effectiveness. How-
ever, there is growing consensus that hard indicators by themselves are insufﬁcient for
evaluating agency performance and need to be supplemented by ‘‘soft’’ indicators, such
as perceived program quality (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Bouckaert and van
de Walle 2003). Subjective measures of agency performance are sometimes criticized
because clients would be ill informed about policies (Brown and Coulter 1983). Such
concerns are raised primarily with respect to local municipal services (Kelly and
Swindell 2002). In contrast, it can be assumed that college graduates possess accurate
and detailed knowledge of their past study program.
We measured the dependent variable graduate satisfaction using an item that con-
fronted graduates with the question whether they would choose the same program at
the same institution again. If not, the graduate could indicate whether (1) she would choose
the same program at a different institution, (2) she would choose a different program
11 Correlations are as follows: rdiploma rate, dropout rate 5 20.05 (p . .05); rdiploma rate, graduate satisfaction 5 20.07
(p . .05); rdropout rate, graduate satisfaction 5 20.21 ( p , .05), the unit being school by year (n 5 90).
12 Some colleges may apply binding recommendations regarding the continuation of studies in the ﬁrst year. This
could be an alternative explanation for high dropout rates.
Schalk et al. Network Embeddedness and Public Agency Performance 639
 at University of G






altogether, or (3) she would choose not to study again at all. We collapsed the last three
categories, creating a dummy variable for graduate satisfaction with the PABO college.13
The variable could capture many things, varying from satisfaction with teachers to the eval-
uation of facilities or traineeships. However, the measure is a simple and attractive indicator
for the evaluation of PABO performance by graduates. Furthermore, this dummy variable
has been used in other studies on program performance as well (Allen and Ramaekers
1999), and it is a core measure used in government study program evaluations and college
benchmarking.
Of all 8,050 PABO graduates in the data set who answered this question, 6,089
responded positively—which is about 75%. We also included control variables at the level
of the graduates. We include gender and age as standard control variables. Gender is
heavily skewed: in the data set, 89% being women. Age ranges from 18 to 62 years, with
a mean of 29 years. In addition, we included a proxy for ability: a dummy variable level of
secondary education to single out those students whose enrollment was based on academic
secondary education, which is the usual entry qualiﬁcation for research-oriented Dutch
universities, as opposed to general secondary, which is the usual entry qualiﬁcation
for universities of applied science (including PABOs). Descriptive statistics for all the
independent variables used are given in the appendix.
RESULTS
The Interorganizational Network Structure
The network of afﬁliation relations between the 28 PABOs is presented in ﬁgure 1 as a val-
ued graph. Each node in the graph represents a college and each line represents the exis-
tence of at least one overlapping afﬁliation. We did not insert labels since we were required
to ensure the anonymity of the colleges. The graph is valued, that is, the thickness of a line
indicates the number of overlapping afﬁliations. Of the 28 PABOs, 13 are isolates. Their
director or board member is not directly involved in any of the afﬁliations. For the 15 PA-
BOs with relations in the interorganizational network, degree centrality varies between
4 and 14 contacts.
When we increase a threshold value for strength of relations, two cohesive subgroups
emerge. The ﬁrst, cohesive subgroup emerges at strength greater than 1 and is clearly
13 Some colleagues pointed out that there may be important differences between the three categories of graduates
who would not do the same study program at the same institution again. For the present study, we assume that
a graduate who would opt to do the same study program at a different institution and another graduate who would opt to
do a different study program both base their choice upon the basis of the same criterion: their satisfaction with the study
program at their institution. Students’ assessments of various dimension of PABO quality, such as practical relevance
and coherence of the program and quality of teachers, differ far more strongly between the ﬁrst and the latter three
categories than between each pair of the three contrast categories. Nonetheless, it is possible that the choice for another
study program altogether could be based upon a mismatch between the student’s preferences and the speciﬁc content of
the PABO study program, regardless of the institution offering the program. To check for such effects, we performed
our analyses presented in the results section also without graduates who would opt for a different study program
altogether (n decreases to 6,535). We still included those graduates who would opt not to study again (n5 77) because
they did not differ systematically from the other graduates with respect to their satisfaction across PABO colleges. The
effects for all cohesive subgroup dummies are stable across the different multilevel models (in fact they even become
stronger). The effect of degree centrality in the network model disappears. This indicates that for graduates who would
choose a different study program, the network effects are weaker, although still present. Hence, dissatisfaction with the
speciﬁc college remains the primary determinant for choosing another study program.
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visible within the left subgraph of the interorganizational network. It is a clique of three
PABOs, which are embedded in a broader cohesive network of weak relations. The second,
highly cohesive subgroup remains at strength greater than 2 and dominates the right sub-
graph. It is a clique of six PABOs, not well embedded in the total interorganizational net-
work. In addition to the two cohesive subgroups, we observe a subgroup of networking
colleges. These have ties with other PABOs but never stronger than one joint afﬁliation.
Finally, the 13 isolated colleges form a distinct, non-cohesive subgroup within the inter-
organizational network. In ﬁgure 1, these colleges are represented by unconnected dots.
Before testing the hypotheses on network activity and cohesive subgroups, we must
ﬁrst inspect whether degree centrality is associated with the subgroups in the interorgani-
zational network. If such an association exists, both network variables measure the same
phenomenon—a common problem in the analysis of small networks. Table 1 shows how
the colleges are distributed for degree centrality and cohesiveness. From the table, we can
conclude that the two network measures partition the PABOs differently. The mean degree
centrality does not differ between the groups of highly cohesive, cohesive, and networking
colleges, and highly cohesive subgroups do not necessarily have more ties than colleges in
the other groups. However, there is still a strong association between degree centrality and
Figure 1
The Interorganizational PABO Network
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cohesiveness, which is obviously driven by the isolated colleges that are neither member of
a subgroup nor have any ties. The fact that there is a strong association for our data implies
that we must test the two variables separately in the multilevel analysis.
Test of Hypotheses for Graduate Satisfaction
In order to test the effect of network centrality of PABOs (hypothesis 1) and the embedded-
ness of PABOs in cohesive subgroups (hypothesis 2) on individual evaluations of their
graduates, we estimated a series of multilevel generalized linear models (Bryk and
Raudenbusch 1992; Hox 2002). The dependent variable (the satisfactionmeasure) indicates
whether a graduate would in retrospect choose the same PABO if given the chance to
choose again. Since this variable is dichotomous, we apply a logit function, and link
the linear multilevel predictions to probabilities. The nested models contain three levels
of analysis: graduates (level 1) are nested in years (level 2), which are nested in PABOs
(level 3). The statistical multilevel approach allows us to explicitly incorporate the depen-
dencies between graduates that result from being enrolled in a particular PABO in a par-
ticular year. Thus, we are able to partition the variance in graduate satisfaction between the
three levels (a PABO component, a year component, and a graduate component).
The three-level logistic model has the following form. Assume we have a number of
explanatory variables (Xp, . . . XP) at the graduate level (level 1), a number of explanatory
variables (Zq, . . . ZQ) at the year level (level 2), and a number of explanatory variables
(Gr, . . . GR) at the PABO level (level 3). The probability that graduate i, who graduated
in year j at PABO k, would choose for the same PABO again is given by pijk . Now, the














is ﬁxed at 1
3
p2, and hence, no error term is speciﬁed at the graduate level
(because it is already part of this speciﬁcation of the error distribution, see Snijders and
Bosker 1999). The intercept b0jk is assumed to vary across years and across PABOs. This
effectively implies that we expect the average graduate satisfaction score to vary across both
levels. Variation in b0jk is explained by year variables Z0q0 and PABO variables G00k. The
Table 1





Highly cohesive subgroup 8 5–14 6
Cohesive subgroup 8 8–8 3
Networking colleges 7 4–8 6
Isolated colleges 0 0 13
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terms u0j and v0k are the year-level and PABO-level variance terms, respectively. Thus, we
focus on the estimation of effects of network variables G00k—those that vary only between
PABOs—on average graduate satisfaction, controlling for contextual factors that may vary
both at the year and PABO levels, as well as control variables that vary at the graduate level.
To test hypothesis 1 (the positive effect of network activity on performance), we include
degree centrality. To test hypothesis 2 (the positive effect of membership of a cohesive sub-
group), we include three dummy variables to capture the different subgroups.
One cautionary remark must be made with respect to the estimation of the model. The
statistical power for parametric tests of effects of variables at the PABO level is limited
since we only have 28 cases in the data set. Therefore, we cannot test for cross-level inter-
actions, such as the moderating effects of network characteristics (e.g., that degree cen-
trality particularly affects the evaluations of motivated students). The limited statistical
power at the PABO level also implies that we can introduce only few control variables
in each model.
We ﬁrst ﬁt an empty model to ﬁnd out howmuch variance in graduate satisfaction is to
be found at the different levels of analysis. Subsequently, we ﬁt ﬁve different models for
each hypothesis. The network model includes only the independent network variables at the
PABO level. The other four models also include these network variables and control suc-
cessively for four different groups of control variables at the PABO year level. The per-
formance model includes the PABO ‘‘diploma rate’’ and ‘‘dropout rate.’’ The environment
model includes the environmental factors ‘‘diversity of funding’’ and ‘‘dependence on state
funding.’’ The stability model includes the organizational stability factors ‘‘ﬂuctuation in
personnel costs’’ and ‘‘ﬂuctuation in student enrolment.’’ Finally, the resources model in-
cludes the effects of ‘‘student-personnel ratio’’ and ‘‘PABO solvency.’’ ‘‘Enrolment in the
PABO college’’ is included as a variable in all models.14 In addition, we include age, gen-
der, and level of secondary education as controls in all ﬁve models at the graduate level.
Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel analyses with degree centrality. The empty
model informs us about how much of the total variance in graduate evaluations can be
attributed to the graduate level, the year level, and the PABO level. The proportion of var-
iance in graduate evaluations attributed to a speciﬁc level is computed by dividing the var-
iance at the speciﬁc level by the sum of the three different variance components. In general,
the explained variance in any logistic regression is considerably lower than the standard R2
for continuous dependent variables. Of the total variance in graduate evaluations, 6.29%
can be attributed to the PABO level, and 4.89% to the year level. These numbers are still
considerable, taking into account the many factors that could play a role at the individual
level.
The results of the analyses for all ﬁve models clearly show that graduates of the ac-
tively networking PABOs are not signiﬁcantly more likely to have a positive view of their
past education at the college. The second column of table 2 shows a weakly signiﬁcant
effect of PABO degree centrality at p , .10 in the expected direction (more ties lead
to more graduate satisfaction). However, when controlling for general college performance
or contextual factors, this effect disappears. Hence, we must reject hypothesis 1 for grad-
uate satisfaction. A possible explanation for the weak effect of PABO degree centrality
found is that ties do not only yield beneﬁts (of learning, joint problem solving, and
14 We truncated the variables ‘‘enrolment PABO college’’ and ‘‘diversity of funding’’ by 1,000.
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Degree centrality 0.035 (0.025)* 0.027 (0.026) 0.036 (0.025)* 0.029 (0.024) 0.032 (0.026)
PABO year level
Diploma rate 20.090 (1.835)
Dropout rate 22.018 (1.395)*














0.018 (0.149) 20.009 (0.150) 0.168 (0.175) 0.035 (0.153)
Graduate level
Female 0.263 (0.001)*** 0.264 (0.001)*** 0.262 (0.001)*** 0.265 (0.001)*** 0.267 (0.001)***
Age 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)***
Level of secondary
education
20.125 (0.001)*** 20.125 (0.001)*** 20.124 (0.001)*** 20.125 (0.001)*** 20.126 (0.001)***
Intercept 1.109 (0.103)### 0.016 (0.146) 0.550 (0.570) 20.030 (0.948) 20.369 (0.266)# 20.300 (0.826)
Variance components
s2e (scale factor) 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
s2u0 (year) 0.181 (0.032)
### 0.173 (0.031)### 0.171 (0.031)### 0.167 (0.030)### 0.167 (0.029)### 0.179 (0.032)###
s2v0 (pabo) 0.233 (0.080)
### 0.248 (0.083)### 0.237 (0.080)### 0.241 (0.081)### 0.205 (0.070)### 0.251 (0.085)###
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coordination) but also costs (e.g., opportunistic behavior by partners). Such costs could be
lower for more stable contexts, which may explain the slightly signiﬁcant effects in the
network model and the environment model.
Hypothesis 2 stated that cohesive subgroups within the interorganizational network
perform better than weakly integrated colleges or isolated colleges. We introduced three
dummy variables identifying these different subgroups, with the subgroup of isolated
PABOs as a reference category. Table 3 shows the results of the multilevel analyses with
cohesive subgroups as the independent network variables at the PABO level. All models
show that, in contrast with network activity, subgroup cohesion and tie strength at the
PABO level have strong and robust effects on individual graduates’ satisfaction.
With respect to the direction of the effects, table 3 clearly shows that the graduates of
colleges in both the cohesive and the highly cohesive subgroups have a signiﬁcantly higher
likelihood of having a favorable opinion about their past education. Interestingly, graduate
satisfaction is not higher for PABOs that have only weak ties in the interorganizational
network. Their average satisfaction is even lower than that of the reference group of iso-
lated colleges, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. The effect of the two
cohesive subgroups on satisfaction remains in all models, controlling for college perfor-
mance and for different contextual variables. Hence, the analyses on graduate satisfaction
ﬁrmly corroborate hypothesis 2. The direction of the effects of the independent variables at
the PABO year level (college performance and contextual variables) is comparable with
that in the previous analyses (network centrality). The results become even more convinc-
ing if we consider the fact that the average satisfaction level in the data is high (.75). Be-
cause the distribution in the model is binomial or S shaped, it is more difﬁcult to detect
signiﬁcant differences in probabilities between schools around a high mean.
We add a ﬁnal analysis to our test of the different multilevel models. The interpretation
of estimates becomes quite complex in a multilevel analysis with a binary outcome variable
and multiple levels of analysis. To explore effect sizes, let us concentrate on the network
model from table 3 and conduct an analysis of explained variance of the estimated dummy
coefﬁcients for each of the two cohesive subgroups in the interorganizational network. Ex-
plained variance in multilevel logistic regression models can be computed by dividing the
variance of the linear predictor by the total variance (Snijders and Bosker 1999).15 In ad-
dition, for all four subgroups, we computed the mean and range of the predicted proba-
bilities that a graduate would positively evaluate the past education. This gives an idea
of the variation in mean graduate satisfaction between the different subgroups of PABOs
in the interorganizational network. Table 4 shows the results.
As we would expect, table 4 shows that the PABO dummies explain a small portion of
the total variation in graduate satisfaction at the individual level. In general, the explained
variance in any logistic regression model is considerably lower than the standard R2 for
continuous dependent variables. However, at the PABO level, the dummy variables explain
17.53% and 13.19% of the variation in graduate satisfaction. In total, the network model
explains 41% of the PABO-level variance (not reported in table 4). In addition, we observe
a marked difference in predicted probabilities between the two cohesive subgroups on the
15 The explained variance for each dummy is computed by subtracting the total explained variance of the linear
predictor without the estimated coefﬁcient from total explained variance with the estimated coefﬁcient, taking into
account the scaling of graduate-level variance. The percentage variance explained is the additive variance to all the
other variables in the network model, which contains all PABO dummies and the graduate-level controls.
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Cohesive Subgroups: Multilevel Logistic Regression of PABO Graduate Satisfaction 2002–2005 (n 5 7,119)
Network Model




Variables Stability Variables Resources Variables
Cohesive subgroupsa
Networking colleges 20.236 (0.220) 20.315 (0.231) 20.304 (0.227) 20.309 (0.216) 20.366 (0.229)
Cohesive subgroup 0.742 (0.280)*** 0.730 (0.309)*** 0.745 (0.275)*** 0.507 (0.280)** 0.737 (0.284)***
Highly cohesive subgroup 0.747 (0.230)*** 0.730 (0.230)*** 0.852 (0.242)*** 0.738 (0.212)*** 0.705 (0.234)***
PABO year level
Diploma rate 20.734 (1.741)
Dropout rate 20.662 (1.368)
Diversity of funding 0.200 (0.121)**
Dependence state funding 0.061 (0.750)
Change in personnel costs 1.111 (0.443)**
Change in enrolment 20.002 (0.002)
Student/personnel ratio 20.037 (0.050)
Solvency 0.973 (0.529)**
Enrolment PABO college 0.150 (0.132) 0.113 (0.130) 0.285 (0.158) 0.173 (0.130)
Graduate level
Female 0.268 (0.001)*** 0.269 (0.001)*** 0.269 (0.001)*** 0.270 (0.001)*** 0.270 (0.001)***
Age 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)*** 0.027 (0.000)***
Level of secondary education 20.128 (0.001)*** 20.128 (0.000)*** 20.128 (0.000)*** 20.128 (0.000)*** 20.128 (0.000)***
Intercept 0.002 (0.124) 0.184 (0.546) 21.165 (0.855) 20.480 (0.225)## 21.013 (0.724)
Variance components
s2e (scale factor) 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
s2u0 (year) 0.167 (0.030)
### 0.164 (0.029)### 0.158 (0.028)### 0.157 (0.028)### 0.168 (0.030)###
s2v0 (pabo) 0.143 (0.055)
### 0.140 (0.053)### 0.129 (0.050)### 0.116 (0.046)## 0.134 (0.052)###
aReference category 5 isolated PABOs.
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one hand, and the networking colleges and isolated colleges at the other hand. To start with,
if we look at the range of predicted probabilities, no graduate in either of the cohesive
subgroups has a predicted probability lower than .65, which means that they are always
more likely to be satisﬁed than not. The mean predicted probability of graduates to have
a positive opinion about their past education is about 85% for these groups. In comparison
to the other colleges, this yields an increase of about 10%. This result is somewhat stronger
than the 5% increase in aggregate performance of school districts due to the network man-
agement activities of superintendents (O’Toole and Meier 2004, 472).16
CONCLUSIONS
This article systematically examined the effects of network activity and network embedd-
edness of 28 Dutch colleges for the training of primary education teachers on their per-
formance. The article ﬁrst tested the effect of network activity of colleges on the
satisfaction of their graduates with the program offered. The results show that having more
network relations per se is not sufﬁcient to perform well. A weak effect of degree centrality
of colleges in the interorganizational network on graduate satisfaction disappeared when
controlling for organizational stability, access to resources, and organizational-level per-
formance. Hence, network activity of the Dutch colleges does not affect graduate satisfac-
tion, whereas the network activity of Texas superintendents strongly contributes to their
pupils’ achievements (Meier and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004).
The difference in results found can be attributed to a number of factors. In the ﬁrst
place, the context of a Dutch interorganizational network of colleges in higher education is
different from the context of Texan public school districts. In the second place, the indicator
of network activity in the present article (degree centrality) is different from the contact
frequency of individual superintendents. The contact frequency of individual superintend-
ents with broad categories of other actors has a wider scope than degree centrality within an
interorganizational network. Further research should reveal whether contact frequencies of
Table 4
Network Model: Differences Between Subgroups of PABOs in the Interorganizational network in (1)
Percentages Variance Explained of Graduate Satisfaction and (2) Predicted Probabilities of Graduates
to Positively Evaluate Their Past Study
% Variance Explained Predicted Probabilities
nPABO Level Total Mean Range
Highly cohesive subgroup 17.53 2.15 0.84 0.65–0.96 972
Cohesive subgroup 13.19 1.27 0.83 0.69–0.94 671
Networking colleges n.s. n.s. 0.72 0.27–0.91 2,842
Isolated collegesa Reference Reference 0.73 0.25–0.94 2,634
aReference category in the network model. n.s., not signiﬁcant.
16 Studies of graduate satisfaction typically focus on moderating variables between network characteristics and
graduate satisfaction. For Dutch universities of applied sciences, programs that were strongly related to occupational
practice and programs that were regarded as challenging were favorably evaluated (Allen and Ramaekers 1999). It was
also found that a longer study duration was associated with a lower level of satisfaction. It seems likely that any effect
of network characteristics of PABOs would work through improved implementation of program characteristics such as
those mentioned above, and through the provision of study facilities that allow a maximum number of students to
complete the program with a minimum of delay.
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colleges in a wider environment also affects their performance. In the third place, the grad-
uate satisfaction is a different indicator for performance than pupil achievements, which the
Texas school studies explain (Meier and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004).
The analyses show that graduates’ satisfaction is consistently and signiﬁcantly higher
for colleges that are member of strong cohesive subgroups in the interorganizational net-
work, which was a different hypothesis in the present study. Our results conﬁrm previous
studies (Provan and Sebastian 1998; Uzzi 1996) on network embeddedness and perfor-
mance. Thus, in the context of the college afﬁliation networks in higher education, main-
taining strong and closed relations positively affects graduate satisfaction. Indeed, based on
a study of three mental health care networks, Provan and Sebastian (1998, 461) conclude
that ‘‘at least in certain contexts, strong, multiplex, reciprocal ties among small network
subgroups can be particularly effective.’’ We demonstrated that signiﬁcant network effects
exist that justify further investigation, in particular for contexts different from Dutch higher
education.
The article contributes to the scarce research about network effects on subjective client
evaluation (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and
Sebastian 1998). Client evaluations are a crucial aspect of public service performance
(Provan and Milward 1995) but seldom integrated as individual cases in one analysis
(Forbes and Lynn 2005, 569). The present article studied the satisfaction of college grad-
uates in a European setting, taking into account the complex nesting structure of graduates
in years (cohorts) and in colleges. Although a full explanation of performance at the client
level was not the aim of the present article, we integrated agency network data, agency
performance data, and client evaluations of agency performance into one statistical design.
The article did not intend to reveal all possible mechanisms that may underlie a sys-
tematic association between agency network embeddedness and client satisfaction. Hence,
many routes for future research exist. First, theoretical research should focus more in depth
on the mechanisms that relate network activity and network embeddedness to performance.
Secondly, it is necessary to further investigate whether cohesive subgroups indeed beneﬁt
from higher levels of interorganizational trust, as postulated. Because interorganizational
trust is so crucial in the literature, future research should focus more in depth on the mech-
anisms that link network embeddedness and interorganizational trust to performance.
Thirdly, the multilevel analysis shows that much of the variation in graduates’ evaluations
is attributable to mechanisms at the client level. This suggests that future research must
ultimately incorporate large-n data on the interactions between ‘‘street-level’’ ofﬁcers
(teachers) and clients (students) to explain client satisfaction.
Given the relatively small number of cases at the level of colleges for the training of
primary teachers (n5 28), and the fact that effects of network embeddedness remainedwhile
controlling for important environmental and organizational context variables, the effects
found could be considered to be an underestimation. Hence, further research should extend
the present study to other contexts than one sector of Dutch higher education. A comparative
analysis of multiple sectors offers the possibility to increase the power of the test while still
including evaluations of graduates as performance measures at the client level.
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Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables in the Analysis
Variables
2002–2005 Collapsed 2002
n Mean SD Minimum Maximum n Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Network level variables
Degree centrality 90 (28) 4.10 4.30 0 14 24 4.04 4.21 0 14
Cohesiveness 90 (28) 2.00 1.00 1 4 24 2.00 1.14 1 4
PABO—year-level variables
Diploma rate 90 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.32 24 0.20 0.03 0.14 0.25
Dropout rate 90 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.43 24 0.26 0.05 0.15 0.36
Diversity of funding 90 4959.24 562.41 2784.00 6570.00 24 4883.17 461.31 3898.00 6249.00
Dependence state funding 90 0.66 0.09 0.12 0.76 24 0.68 0.04 0.55 0.76
Change in personnel costs 90 0.29 0.16 0.13 0.95 24 0.29 0.16 0.14 0.92
Change in enrolment 90 68.96 45.29 21.43 253.40 24 77.17 51.05 26.32 247.00
Student/personnel ratio 90 13.93 1.47 11.40 17.1 24 13.57 1.43 11.60 16.80
Solvency 90 0.37 0.15 0.16 0.75 24 0.36 0.15 0.16 0.68
Enrolment PABO college 90 1195.72 712.30 333.00 3991.00 24 1058.13 651.25 348.00 3284.00
Graduate-level variables
Female 7119 0.89 0.31 0 1 1228 0.90 0.31 0 1
Age 7119 29.13 9.20 18 62 1228 29.13 9.20 18 62
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Table A1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables in the Analysis
Variables
2003 2004 2005
n Mean SD Minimum Maximum n Mean SD Minimum Maximum n Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Network level variables
Degree centrality 23 3.48 4.02 0 12 21 4.05 3.97 0 12 22 3.50 3.94 0 12
Cohesiveness 23 1.87 1.10 1 4 21 2.10 1.18 1 4 22 1.95 1.17 1 4
PABO—year-level
variables
Diploma rate 23 0.22 0.02 0.19 0.26 21 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.32 22 0.24 0.03 0.20 0.32
Dropout rate 23 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.32 21 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.32 22 0.26 0.07 0.10 0.43
Diversity of funding 23 5063.22 475.06 4011.00 6417.00 21 4906.76 668.44 2784.00 6485.00 22 4983.64 650.10 3198.00 6570.00
Dependence state
funding
23 0.67 0.04 0.53 0.75 21 0.64 0.13 0.12 0.72 22 0.64 0.12 0.15 0.74
Change in personnel
costs
23 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.77 21 0.29 0.17 0.13 0.81 22 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.95
Change in enrolment 23 72.71 50.15 21.43 253.40 21 65.01 42.84 27.60 221.20 22 59.80 35.48 22.80 182.20
Student/personnel ratio 23 13.76 1.37 11.60 16.50 21 14.12 1.67 11.5 17.1 22 14.28 1.40 11.40 16.70
Solvency 23 0.37 0.16 0.18 0.72 21 0.38 0.16 0.17 0.71 22 0.39 0.15 0.20 0.75
Enrolment PABO
college
23 1090.94 718.96 333.00 3598.00 21 1232.76 748.82 564.00 3849.00 22 1272.75 757.98 602.00 3991.00
Graduate-level
variables
Female 1640 0.90 0.30 0 1 1924 0.89 0.32 0 1 2327 0.89 0.31 0 1
Age 1640 27.12 7.63 18 57 1924 30.75 10.31 18 62 2327 30.60 9.72 20 60
Level of secondary
education
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